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I. INTRODUCTION
1

After the controversy over WikiLeaks erupted, members of Congress
introduced the proposed SHIELD Act (“the Act”), which would have
amended the Espionage Act of 1917 to make it a crime for any person
knowingly and willfully to disseminate, in any manner prejudicial to the

* Geoffrey R. Stone is the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law at
the University of Chicago.
1. WikiLeaks is an international online organization created by Julian Assange that
publishes submissions of classified data from anonymous sources. About: What is
WikiLeaks?, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). In
November 2010, WikiLeaks collaborated with major global media organizations to release
thousands of classified U.S. State Department diplomatic cables allegedly leaked to
WikiLeaks by Army Private Bradley Manning. See, e.g., Bradley Manning, N.Y.TIMES:
TIMES TOPICS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/
m/bradley_e_manning/index.html. The cables included revelations of the views of
American diplomats relating to such matters as the Middle East peace process, nuclear
disarmament, actions in the War on Terror, climate change, and U.S. intelligence and
counterintelligence efforts. Id.
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safety or interest of the United States, “any classified information”
“concerning the human intelligence activities of the United States or . .
3
. concerning the identity of a classified source or informant” working with
the intelligence community of the United States.
Although the Act might be constitutional as applied to a government
employee, like Bradley Manning, who “leaks” such classified material, it is
plainly unconstitutional as applied to others, like Julian Assange and
WikiLeaks, who subsequently publish or otherwise disseminate such
information. With respect to such other individuals or organizations, the
Act violates the First Amendment unless, at the very least, it is expressly
limited to situations in which the individual knows that the dissemination
of the classified material poses a clear and present danger of grave harm to
the nation.
The clear and present danger standard, in varying forms, has been a
central element of our First Amendment jurisprudence ever since Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes first enunciated it in his 1919 opinion in Schenck v.
4
United States. In the ninety years since Schenck, the precise meaning of
5
“clear and present danger” has shifted, but the principle that animates the
standard was stated eloquently by Justice Louis D. Brandeis in his brilliant
1927 concurring opinion in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards . . . .
They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty . . . . Only an emergency
can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be
reconciled with freedom. Such . . . is the command of the Constitution.
It is therefore, always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging
6
free speech . . . by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.

With that observation in mind, I will examine two central questions: (1)
Does the clear and present danger standard apply to unlawful leaks of
classified information by government employees?; and (2) Does the clear
and present danger standard apply to the dissemination of classified
information derived from those unlawful leaks? These are fundamental

2. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (1996).
3. H.R. 6506, 111th Cong. (2010).
4. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
5. See Frank Strong, Fifty Years of “Clear and Present Danger”: From Schenck to
Brandenburg – and Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41. Cf. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM (2004) [hereinafter PERILOUS TIMES].
6. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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First Amendment questions. Before turning to them, though, a bit of
historical context is necessary.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREE SPEECH
A wartime environment inevitably intensifies the tension between
individual liberty and national security. But there are wise and unwise ways
to strike the appropriate balance. Throughout American history, our
government has excessively restricted public discourse in the name of
national security. In 1798, for example, on the eve of a threatened conflict
with France, Congress enacted the Sedition Act of 1798, which effectively
made it a crime for any person to criticize the president, Congress, or the
7
government itself. During the Civil War, the government shut down
8
“disloyal” newspapers and imprisoned critics of the president’s policies.
During World War I, the government enacted the Espionage Act of 1917
and the Sedition Act of 1918, which made it unlawful for any person to
criticize the war, the draft, the government, the president, the flag, the
9
military, or the cause of the United States. As a consequence, free and
10
open debate was almost completely stifled. Later, during the Cold War,
as Americans were whipped into frenzy of fear of the “Red Menace,”
loyalty programs, political infiltration, blacklisting, legislative
investigations, and criminal prosecutions of supposed Communist
11
“subversives” and sympathizers swept the nation.
Over time, we have come to understand that these episodes from our
past were grievous errors in judgment in which we allowed fear and
anxiety to override our good judgment and our essential commitment to
individual liberty and democratic self-governance. We have come to
understand that, in order to maintain a robust system of democratic selfgovernance, our government cannot constitutionally be empowered to
punish speakers, even in the name of national security without a compelling
12
justification. This is especially true in the realm of government secrets,
for as James Madison observed, “[a] popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
13
Tragedy; or, perhaps both.” As Madison warned, if citizens do not know
7. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 1790 TO THE
PRESENT 1–21 (2007).
8. See id. at 22–40.
9. See id. at 41–63.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 85–106.
12. See STONE, supra note 5, at 550–57.
13. JAMES MADISON, 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P.
Putnam’s Sons 1910) (1822).
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what their own government is doing, then they are hardly in a position to
question its judgments or to hold their elected representatives accountable.
Government secrecy, although sometimes surely necessary, can also pose a
direct threat to the very idea of self-governance.

III. THE DILEMMA
Here, then, is the dilemma: the government often has exclusive
possession of information about its policies, programs, processes, and
activities that would be of great value to informed public debate. But
government officials often insist that such information must be kept secret,
even from those to whom they are accountable—the American people.
How should we resolve this dilemma? The issue is complex and has many
dimensions.
The reasons why government officials want secrecy, for example, are
many and varied. They range from the truly compelling to the patently
illegitimate. Sometimes, government officials may want secrecy because
they fear that the disclosure of certain information might seriously
undermine the nation’s security (for example, by revealing detailed battle
plans on the eve of battle). Sometimes, they may want secrecy because they
simply do not want to deal with public criticism of their decisions, or
because they do not want the public, Congress, or the courts to be in a
position to override their decisions, which they believe to be sound.
Sometimes, they may want secrecy because disclosure will expose their
own incompetence, foolishness, or wrongdoing. Some of these reasons for
secrecy are obviously much more worthy of respect than others. Part of the
problem is that government officials who want secrecy for questionable
reasons are often tempted to justify their actions by putting forth seemingly
compelling, but in reality exaggerated or even disingenuous, justifications.
Adding to the complexity, the contribution of any particular
disclosure to informed public discourse may vary widely depending upon
the nature of the information and the surrounding circumstances. The
disclosure of some classified information may be extremely valuable to
public debate (for example, the revelation of possibly unwise or even
unlawful or unconstitutional government programs, such as the secret use
of coercive interrogation or the secret authorization of widespread
electronic surveillance). The disclosure of other confidential information,
however, may be of little or no legitimate value to public debate (for
example, the publication of the specific identities of covert American
agents in Iran for no reason other than exposure).
The most vexing problem arises when the public disclosure of secret
information is both harmful to the national security and valuable to selfgovernance. Suppose, for example, the government undertakes a study of
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the effectiveness of security measures at the nation’s nuclear power plants.
The study concludes that several nuclear power plants are especially
vulnerable to terrorist attack. Should this study be kept secret or should it
be disclosed to the public? On the one hand, publishing the report will
reveal our vulnerabilities to terrorists. On the other hand, publishing the
report would alert the public to the situation, enable citizens to press
government officials to remedy the problems and empower the public to
hold accountable those public officials who failed to keep them safe. The
public disclosure of such information could both harm and benefit the
nation. Should the study be made public?
In theory, this question can be framed quite simply: do the benefits of
disclosure outweigh its costs? That is, does the value of the disclosure to
informed public deliberation outweigh its danger to the national security?
Alas, as a practical matter this simple framing of the issue is not terribly
helpful. It is exceedingly difficult to measure in any objective, consistent,
predictable, or coherent manner either the value of the disclosure to public
discourse or its danger to national security. And it is even more difficult to
balance such incommensurable values against one another.
Moreover, even if we were to agree that this is the right question, we
would still have to determine who should decide whether the benefits
outweigh the costs of disclosure. Should this be decided by public officials
whose responsibility it is to protect the national security? By public
officials who might have an incentive to cover up their own mistakes? By
low-level public officials who believe their superiors are keeping
information secret for inadequate or illegitimate reasons—that is, by
leakers? By reporters, editors, bloggers, and others who have gained access
to the information? By judges and jurors, in the course of criminal
prosecutions of leakers, journalists, and publishers?
I will focus on two questions. First, in what circumstances can the
government constitutionally punish a public employee for disclosing
classified information to a journalist for the purpose of publication? That is,
in what circumstances may the government punish leakers? Second, in
what circumstances can the government constitutionally punish the
publication or public dissemination of classified information? Should it
matter whether the publisher or disseminator obtained the information
through an illegal leak?

IV. THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The first question concerns the First Amendment rights of public
employees. To understand those rights, we must establish a baseline. Let us
begin, then, with the rights of individuals who are not government
employees. That is, in what circumstances may ordinary people, who are
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not public employees, be held legally accountable for revealing information
to another for the purpose of publication? Answering that question will
enable us to establish a baseline definition of First Amendment rights. We
can then inquire whether the First Amendment rights of government
employees are any different.
In general, an ordinary individual (an individual who is not a
government employee) has a broad First Amendment right to reveal
information to journalists or others for the purpose of publication. There
are a few limitations, however.
First, the Supreme Court has long recognized that there are certain
“limited classes of speech,” such as false statements of fact, obscenity, and
threats, that “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas” and are
14
therefore of only low First Amendment value. Such speech may be
restricted without satisfying the usual demands of the First Amendment.
For example, if X makes a knowingly false and defamatory statement about
Y to a journalist, with the understanding that the journalist will publish the
15
information, X might be liable to Y for the tort of defamation.
Second, private individuals sometimes voluntarily contract with other
private individuals to limit their speech. Violation of such a private
agreement may be actionable as a breach of contract. For example, if X
takes a job as a salesman and agrees as a condition of employment not to
disclose his employer’s customer lists to competitors, he might be liable for
breach of contract if he reveals the lists to a reporter for a trade journal with
the expectation that the journal will publish the list. In such circumstances,
the individual has voluntarily agreed to limit what otherwise would be a
First Amendment right. Such privately negotiated waivers of constitutional
16
rights are generally enforceable.
Third, there may be situations, however rare, in which an individual
discloses previously nonpublic information to a journalist in circumstances
in which publication of the information would be so dangerous to society
that the individual might be punished for disclosing the information to the
journalist for purposes of further dissemination. For example, suppose a
privately-employed scientist discovers how to manufacture anthrax bacteria
at home. The harm caused by the public dissemination of that information
might be so likely, imminent, and grave that the scientist could be punished
17
for facilitating its publication.

14.
15.
16.
17.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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These examples illustrate the few circumstances in which an
individual might be held legally responsible for disclosing information to
another for the purpose of public dissemination. In general, however, the
First Amendment guarantees individuals very broad freedom to share
information with others for the purpose of publication.
To what extent is a government employee in a similar position? When
we ask about the First Amendment rights of public employees, we must
focus on the second of the three situations examined above. That is, it is the
waiver of rights issue that poses the critical question. Although the first and
third situations can arise in the government employee context, it is the
waiver issue that is at the core of the matter.
At its most bold, the government’s position is simple: just like a
private individual, the government should be able to enter into contracts
with people in which they voluntarily agree to waive their constitutional
rights. As long as the waiver is voluntary, that should end the matter. That
is not the law, however. The Supreme Court has long recognized that,
unlike private entities, the government cannot constitutionally insist that
individuals surrender their constitutional rights as a condition of public
18
employment or receipt of other government benefits. It would be
unconstitutional, for example, for the government to require individuals to
agree as a condition of government employment that they will never
criticize the president, never practice the Muslim faith, never have an
abortion, or never assert their constitutional right to be free from
19
unreasonable searches and seizures.
It would be no answer for the government to point out that the
individuals had voluntarily agreed not to criticize the president, practice
their faith, have an abortion, or assert their Fourth Amendment rights, for
even if individuals consent to surrender their constitutional rights in order
to obtain a government job, the government cannot constitutionally
condition employment on the waiver of those rights. The government
cannot legitimately use its leverage over jobs, welfare benefits, driver’s
licenses, tax deductions, zoning waivers, and the like to extract waivers of
20
individual freedoms.
This does not mean, however, that the government can never require
individuals to waive their constitutional rights as a condition of public
18. See, e.g., Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. at 663.
19. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no
‘right’ to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons,” it may not do so “on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”).
20. See Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889,
915 (1986).
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employment. There are at least two circumstances, relevant here, in which
the government may restrict the First Amendment rights of its employees.
First, as the Supreme Court recognized in its 1968 decision in Pickering v.
Board of Education of Township High School District 205, the government
“has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
21
the speech of the citizenry in general.” The problem, the Court said, is to
arrive at a sensible balance between the interests of the public employee, as
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern, and the interest of
the government, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of its
22
activities.
The Hatch Act, for instance, prohibits government employees from
23
taking an active part in political campaigns. The goal is to insulate
government employees from undue political pressure and improper
influence. To enable government employees to perform their jobs properly,
the government may require them to waive what would otherwise be the
24
First Amendment right to participate in partisan political activities.
Similarly, a government employee’s disclosure of confidential information
to a journalist might jeopardize the government’s ability to function
effectively. For example, if an IRS employee gives X’s confidential tax
records to a reporter, this might seriously impair the public’s confidence in
the tax system and thus undermine the government’s capacity to function
efficiently.
A second reason why the government may sometimes restrict what
otherwise would be the protected First Amendment rights of government
employees is that the employee learns the information only by virtue of his
government employment. Arguably, it is one thing for the government to
prohibit its employees from speaking in ways other citizens can speak, but
something else entirely for it to prohibit them from speaking in ways other
citizens cannot speak. If a government employee gains access to
confidential information only because of his public employment, then
prohibiting him from disclosing that information to anyone outside the
government might be said not to substantially restrict his First Amendment
25
rights, because he had no right to know the information in the first place.

21. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
22. Id.
23. 7 U.S.C. § 361(a) (2006).
24. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
25. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Robert C. Post, The
Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 169.
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There is little clear law on this question. In its 1980 decision in Snepp
v. United States, however, the Supreme Court held that a former employee
of the CIA could constitutionally be held to his agreement not to publish
“any information or material relating to the [CIA]” without prior
26
approval. The Court did not suggest that every government employee can
be required to abide by such a rule. Rather, it emphasized that a “former
intelligence agent’s publication of . . . material relating to intelligence
27
activities can be detrimental to vital national interests.” In light of Snepp
and Pickering, it seems reasonable to assume that a public employee who
discloses to a journalist or other disseminator classified information, the
disclosure of which could appreciably harm the national security, has
violated his position of trust and ordinarily may be discharged and even
criminally punished without violating the First Amendment.
Now, it is important to note that this conclusion is specific to
government employees. It does not govern those who are not government
employees. Unlike government employees, who have agreed to abide by
constitutionally permissible restrictions of their speech, journalists and
others who might disseminate such information have not agreed to waive
their rights. This distinction between government employees and other
individuals is critical in the context of confidential information.
Information the government wants to keep secret may be of great value to
the public. The public disclosure of an individual’s tax return may
undermine the public’s confidence in the tax system, but it may also reveal
important information, for example, about a political candidate’s finances.
In theory, of course, it would be possible for courts to decide in each
instance whether the First Amendment protects an unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information by a government employee by deciding whether
the value of the information to the public outweighs the government’s
interest in secrecy. But, as already noted, such case-by-case judgments
would put courts in an exceedingly awkward and difficult position and
would in effect convert the First Amendment into a constitutional Freedom
of Information Act. The Supreme Court has eschewed that approach and
has instead granted the government considerable deference in deciding
whether and when government employees have a constitutional right to
disclose confidential government information. In short, the courts have
generally held that the government may punish a government employee for
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, as long as the
28
disclosure would be “potentially damaging to the United States.”
26. 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980).
27. Id. at 511–12; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
28. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
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This is a far cry from requiring the government to prove that the
disclosure will create a clear and present danger of grave harm to the
nation. The gap between these two standards represents the difference
between the rights of government employees and the rights of other
individuals. It is what the government employee surrenders as a condition
of his employment; it is the effect of Pickering balancing; and it is a
measure of the deference we grant the government in the management of
its internal affairs.
There is, of course, a fundamental disadvantage in this approach.
Information may be both potentially dangerous to national security and
valuable to public debate. Consider, for example, evaluations of new
weapons systems or government policies regulating the permissible
conduct of covert agents. One might reasonably argue that this information
should be available to the public to enable informed public discussion of
such policies. But the approach to government employee speech just
described ordinarily will empower the government to forbid the disclosure
of such information, regardless of its value to public discourse. We accept
this approach largely for the sake of simplicity and ease of administration.
We should be under no illusions, however, about its impact. This standard
gives inordinate weight to secrecy at the expense of accountability and
public deliberation.

V. THE RIGHT TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION
This, then, presents the second question: in what circumstances may
the government constitutionally prohibit an individual or organization from
publishing or disseminating unlawfully leaked classified information? In
the entire history of the United States, the government has never prosecuted
anyone (other than a government employee) for publicly disseminating
29
such information.
Because there has never been such a prosecution, the Supreme Court
has never had occasion to rule on such a case. The closest it has come to
such a situation was New York Times Co. v. United States, commonly
known as the Pentagon Papers case, in which the Court held
unconstitutional the government’s effort to enjoin the New York Times and
the Washington Post from publishing a purloined copy of a top secret
30
Defense Department study of the Vietnam War. Justice Potter Stewart’s
opinion best captures the view of the Court. “We are asked,” he wrote:

Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 25 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006).
29. See generally Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Sunstein, supra note 20.
30. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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[T]o prevent the publication . . . of material that the Executive Branch
insists should not, in the national interest, be published. I am convinced
that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents
involved. But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or
31
its people.

Thus, in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court held that although
elected officials have broad authority to keep classified information secret,
once that information gets into other hands the government has only very
limited authority to prevent its further dissemination. This may seem an
awkward, even incoherent, state of affairs. If the government can
constitutionally prohibit public employees from disclosing classified
information to others, why can’t it enjoin the recipients of that material
from disseminating it further?
But one could just as easily flip the question. If individuals have a
First Amendment right to publish classified information unless publication
will “surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
Nation or its people,” why should the government be allowed to prohibit its
employees from disclosing that information to others merely because it
32
poses a potential danger to national security? If we view the issue from
the perspective of either the public’s interest in informed discourse or the
government’s interest in secrecy, it would seem that the same rule logically
should apply to both public employees and those who would disseminate
the information. The very different standards governing government
employees on the one hand, and other speakers on the other, thus present a
puzzle.
In fact, there are quite sensible reasons for this seemingly awkward
state of affairs. Although the government has broad authority to prohibit
public employees from leaking classified information, that rule is based not
on a careful or definitive balancing of the government’s need for secrecy
against the public’s interest in the information, but on the need for a clear
33
and easily administrable rule for government employees. For the sake of
simplicity, the law governing public employees overprotects the
government’s legitimate interest in secrecy relative to the public’s
legitimate interest in learning about the activities of the government. But
the need for a simple rule for public employees has nothing to do with the
rights of others who would publish the information or the needs of the
public for an informed public discourse. And under ordinary First
Amendment standards, those who wish to disseminate such information
31. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (2006).
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have the right to do so—unless the government can demonstrate that the
publication presents a clear and present danger of grave harm. In this
situation, the law arguably overprotects the right to publish, as compared to
a case-by-case balancing of costs and benefits.
As Justice Stewart observed in the Pentagon Papers case, even though
the publication of some of the materials at issue might harm “the national
interest,” their dissemination could not constitutionally be prohibited unless
their dissemination would “surely result in direct, immediate, and
34
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.” It is important to note
that there are sound reasons for this conclusion.
First, the mere fact that dissemination might harm the national interest
does not mean that that harm outweighs the benefits of publication. Second,
a case-by-case balancing of harm against benefit would ultimately prove
unwieldy, unpredictable, and impracticable. Thus, just as in the government
employee situation, there is a compelling need for a clear and predictable
rule. Third, as we have learned from our own history, there are great
pressures that lead both government officials and the public itself to
underestimate the benefits of publication and overstate the potential harm
of publication in times of national anxiety. A strict clear and present danger
standard serves as a barrier to protect us against this danger.
Finally, a central principle of the First Amendment is that the
suppression of public speech must be the government’s last rather than its
first resort in addressing a potential problem. If there are other means by
which government can prevent or reduce the danger, it must exhaust those
other means before it can suppress the freedom of speech. This, too, is an
essential premise of the clear and present danger standard. In the secrecy
situation, the most obvious way for government to prevent the danger is by
ensuring that seriously damaging information is not leaked in the first
place. Indeed, the Supreme Court made this point quite clearly in its 2001
decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper, in which a radio commentator received in
the mail from an anonymous source a tape recording of an unlawfully
intercepted telephone conversation, which the commentator then played on
35
the air. The Court held that the broadcast was protected by the First
Amendment, even though the anonymous source could be prosecuted for
36
committing the unlawful wiretap. As the Court explained, when an
individual receives information “from a source who has obtained it
unlawfully,” an individual may not be punished for publicly disseminating
information relevant to public discourse, “absent a need . . . of the highest
34.
35.
36.

Perry, 403 U.S. at 730.
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
Id.
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37

order.” The Court reasoned that if “the sanctions that presently attach to
[unlawful wiretapping] do not provide sufficient deterrence,” then “perhaps
those sanctions should be made more severe,” but “it would be quite
remarkable to hold” that an individual can constitutionally be punished
merely for disseminating information because the government failed to
38
“deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”

VI. CONCLUSION
This is surely a “disorderly situation,” but it seems the best possible
39
solution. If we grant the government too much power to punish those who
disseminate information useful to public debate, then we risk too great a
sacrifice of public deliberation. If we grant the government too little power
to control confidentiality at the source, then we risk too great a sacrifice of
40
secrecy and government efficiency. The solution is thus to attempt to
reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable values of secrecy and accountability
by guaranteeing both a strong authority of the government to prohibit leaks
and an expansive right of others to disseminate them.
Three questions remain: first, does the same constitutional standard
govern criminal prosecutions and prior restraints? Second, what sorts of
disclosures might satisfy the clear and present danger standard? And third,
how should we deal with information that both satisfies the clear and
present danger standard and contributes significantly to public debate?
First, in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court emphasized that it was
dealing with an injunction against speech. An injunction is a prior restraint,
a type of speech restriction that, in the Court’s words, bears a particularly
41
“‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity.” This raises the
question whether the test stated in the Pentagon Papers case should govern
criminal prosecutions as well as prior restraints.
In dealing with expression at the very heart of the First Amendment—
speech about the conduct of government itself—the distinction between
prior restraint and criminal prosecution should not carry much weight. The
standard applied in the Pentagon Papers case is essentially the same
standard the Court would apply in a criminal prosecution of an organization
or individual for publicly disseminating information about the conduct of

37. Id. at 528.
38. Id. at 529–30.
39. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975).
40. Id. at 79–92.
41. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971); see also id. at
730–31 (White, J., concurring).
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government. The clear and present danger standard has never been limited
to cases of prior restraint.
Second, is there any speech that could constitutionally be punished
under this standard? The examples traditionally offered include the sailing
dates of transports or the precise location of combat troops in wartime. The
publication of such information would instantly make American troops
vulnerable to enemy attack and thwart battle plans already underway. Other
examples might include publication of the identities of covert CIA
operatives in Iran, or public disclosure that the government has broken the
Taliban’s secret code, thus alerting the enemy to change its cipher. In
situations like these, the harm from publication might be sufficiently likely,
imminent, and grave to warrant punishing the disclosure.
Third, an important feature of these examples often passes unnoticed.
What makes these situations so compelling is not only the likelihood,
imminence, and magnitude of the harm, but also the implicit assumption
that this sort of information do not meaningfully contribute to public
debate. In most circumstances, there is no evident need for the public to
know the secret sailing dates of transports or the secret location of
American troops on the eve of battle. It is not as if these matters will
instantly be topics of political discussion. After the fact, of course, such
information may be critical in evaluating the effectiveness of our military
leaders, but at the very moment the ships are set to sail or the troops are set
to attack, it is less clear what contribution the information would make to
public debate. The point is not that these examples involve low value
speech in the conventional sense of the term, but rather that they involve
information that does not seem particularly newsworthy at the moment of
publication. It is this factor that seems to play an implicit role in making the
illustrations so compelling.
The failure to notice this feature of these hypotheticals can lead to a
critical failure of analysis. Interestingly, an analogous failure was implicit
in the famous example Justice Holmes first used to elucidate the clear and
42
present danger test—the false cry of fire in a crowded theatre. Why can
the false cry of fire be restricted? Because it creates a clear and present
danger of a mad dash to the exits. Therefore, Holmes reasoned, the test for
restricting speech must be whether it creates a clear and present danger of
serious harm.
But Holmes’s reasoning was incomplete. Suppose the cry of fire is
true? In that case, we would not punish the speech—even though it still
causes a mad dash to the exits—because the value of the speech outweighs
42. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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the harm it creates. Thus, at least two factors must be considered in
analyzing this situation—the harm caused by the speech and the value of
the speech. Suppose, for example, a newspaper accurately reports that
American troops in Afghanistan recently murdered twenty members of the
Taliban in cold blood. As a result of this publication, members of the
Taliban predictably kidnap and murder twenty American citizens. Can the
newspaper constitutionally be punished for disclosing the initial massacre?
The answer must be no. Even if there were a clear and present danger that
the retaliation would follow, and even if we agree—as we must—that this
were a grave harm, the information is simply too important to the American
people to punish its disclosure.
What this suggests is that to justify the criminal punishment of the
press for publishing classified information, the government must prove not
only that the defendant published classified information, the publication of
which would result in likely, imminent, and grave harm to national
security, but also that the publication would not significantly contribute to
public debate.
The bottom line is this: the proposed SHIELD Act is plainly
unconstitutional. At the very least, its prohibition must be limited to those
circumstances in which the individual who publicly disseminates classified
information knew that the dissemination would create a clear and present
danger of grave harm to the nation or its people. A criminal prosecution of
Julian Assange or WikiLeaks would thus violate the First Amendment. On
the other hand, as a government employee, Bradley Manning was subject to
more significant restrictions on his freedom to leak classified information.
He is therefore in a much more vulnerable position.
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